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WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION - OCCUPATIONAL DISEASE - TUBERCULOSIS -
Paider v. Park East Movers, 25 App. Div. 2d 62 (N.Y. 1966). - Claimant contracted
tuberculosis from a fellow truck driver when he was confined with him in the same cab
for some time. Alleging that the cab of the truck was the instrumentality of transmis-
sion, the claimant stressed that this was an occupational disease. The court, however,
said that it was the co-employee and not the occupation which caused the disease. Thus,
there being no distinctive mechanism of transmission inherent in the job, this was not
an occupational disease. Further, the hazard of contracting tuberculosis is not neces-
sarily occupational since it could be transmitted in any type of employment.
FEDERAL CML PROCEDURE - PROCESS - DE ECTS AND OBJECTIONS - QUASHING
OR VACATION - ON MOTION - Keckler v. Brookwood Country Club, 248 F. Supp.
645 (N.D. Ill. 1965). - Where an Indiana manufacturer of golf carts with no contacts
with the forum was named as a defendant in a suit to recover damages for personal
injuries when a golf cart tipped over on the plaintiff and sought to quash service of
process made upon him pursuant to the Illinois "long-arm" statute the court held, first,
that although the action was brought upon the theory of strict tort or breach of implied
warranty of merchantability the injury was still a tortious act, and, therefore, was within
the provisions of the statute, reasoning that though a warranty action was neither tort
nor contract, it was closer to the concept of tort, and that there was no good reason for
not permitting such claims to come within that statute. However, in quashing the ser-
vice of process, the court held that insufficient facts -were presented in the complaint to
show adequate grounds for the service to be within the limits of due process. The
court determined that once a defendant acts to take advantage of state law he will con-
clusively be presumed to have received a benefit therefrom, and where one has re-
ceived a benefit from the laws of a forum he has such contacts with the forum as wouldjustify service of process under a long arm statute and within the limits of due process.
The court then reasoned that the voluntary placing of goods in the Illinois market, and
the reasonable anticipation that an action could result from the contract would be suf-
ficient to indicate defendant's benefit from state law. The court stated that since the
distribution pattern of the goods created the jurisdictional act, the complaint must show
such a pattern within the forum with some particularity; otherwise, the limits of due
process would be exceeded.
INCOME TAX - RIGiiT TO COUNSEL - Kohatsu v. United States, 351 F.2d 898 (9th
Cir. 1965). - In a suit for income tax evasion the defendant appealed on the ground
that he was denied due process in that the agents of the Internal Revenue Service did
not warn him of his constitutional rights and because he did not have benefit of counsel.
The information that the agents obtained was through defendant's voluntary action, and
without stealth, trickery, or misrepresentation in the course of investigation of the de-
fendant's return. The investigation of the 1958 return started in 1960 and the de-
fendant was not informed of his constitutional rights until late 1961 after another in-
vestigatory team was assigned to work on the case. When this other team was assigned
defendant contends that the proceedings moved from investigatory to accusatory and
that he then should have been informed of his rights. The court ruled against the de-
fendant and affirmed the lower court.
HABEAS CORPUS - RETROACrVITY - RIGHT TO COUNSEL - United States v. Pate,
350 F.2d 240 (7th Cir. 1965). - The accused was arrested and questioned by the
police for two days without the assistance of counsel which he had requested. He was not
informed of his rights to counsel or to remain silent. His conviction became final prior
to the decision in Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964). The court held that it
would not permit collateral attack by habeas corpus on a conviction which became final
prior to the announcement of the right to counsel in custodial interrogations.
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - INVOLUNTARY SERVITUDE OF MENTAL DEFECTIVES -
OFFICIAL IMMUNITY - Job$tso v. Henn, 335 F.2d 129 (2d Cir. 1966). - Plaintiff
inmate's suit against officials of a mental institution, alleging involuntary servitude in a
therapeutic work program, was dismissed by the district court for failing to state a cause
of action. In reversing, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals held that certain manda-
tory work programs, while therapeutic in nature, may be so ruthless in the amount of
work imposed as to amount to involuntary servitude, and plaintiff was entitled to prove
such an allegation.. The court-made rule of official immunity was held to be no bar
to suits against public officials under the Civil Rights Act.
ADMIRALTY - STATUTES OF IITATIONS AS AFFECniNG LAcHES - Giddens v.
Isbrandtsen Co., 355 F.2d 125 (4th Cir. 1966). - Plaintiff longshoreman's suit at law
against a shipowner for personal injury resulting from a maritime tort was dismissed by
the district court as barred by laches. The Fourth Circuit, in reversing, held that the
three-year statute of limitations of the Jones Act was a much more influential analogy to
laches in an admiralty law action than the two year state statute against tort actions
relied on by the lower court, particularly where the defendant was able to show no
prejudice from the delay.
INTERNAL REVENUE - LIENs - LIQUOR PERMITS - SUBJECT TO CHATTEL MORT-
GAGE - WHAT LAW GOVERNS - Paramoant Finance Co. v. S & C Tavern, Inc., 245
F. Supp. 766 (N.D. Ohio 1965). - Plaintiff, a finance company, filed an action to
foreclose its chattel mortgage on the assets of the S & C Tavern. The United States
Government was made a party defendant since the Internal Revenue Service, pursuant
to a tax lien on said tavern, claimed the net proceeds of the sale of the business. The
determination of what party was entitled to the net proceeds of the foreclosure sale was
dependent upon a determination of whether the sale price represented the value of the
tangible property, or represented solely the value of the liquor permit. A finding in
favor of the latter alternative would have required a ruling in favor of the Government,
since the Government had a statutory lien on all property, both real and personal, of
the deficient taxpayer. The court held that plaintiff was entitled to the net proceeds of
the sale, since a liquor permit was not personal property, and had no monetary value.
Thus, the court stated that the sale price represented the value of the business to which
the plaintiff had a valid security interest.
CRIMINAL LAW - DEFENSE OF Nor GuILTY BY REASON OF INSANITY - BURDEN
OF PROOF - DEGREE OF EVIDENCE - State v. Colby, 6 Ohio Misc. 19 (C.P. 1966). -
Defendant was tried before a three judge panel for the crime of murder in the first-
degree in connection with the slaying of a nine-year old youth. The pleas were not
guilty and not guilty by reason of insanity. The court, applying Ohio's "right-wrong"
test for determining criminal responsibility, found the defendant not guilty by reason of
insanity. However, the court went further and severely criticized the "right-wrong"
test, used in the instant case. The court declared the test to be based upon an entirely
obsolete and misleading conception of the nature of insanity. It was strongly urged
that Ohio adopt the test set forth in section 4.01 of the Model Penal Code, which pro-
vides as follows: "A person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of
such conduct as a result of mental disease or defect he lacks substantial capacity either
to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the require-
ments of law."
MONOPOLIES - MERGERS - CLAYTON ACT - National Tea Co., 3 TRADE REG. REP.
(1966 Trade Cas.) 5 17463. - In a four-to-one decision the Federal Trade Commission
issued a cease and desist order against the National Tea Company to restrain it from
making acquisitions for the next ten years without prior Commission approval. The
order came after a finding that National Tea's acquisitions tended to lessen competition
in the market areas affected. No specific concentrations in market areas were proven;
however, it was held that the tendency to lessen competition itself was a violation, of
section 7 of the Clayton Act. Both the majority and concurring opinion cited United
States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963), as authority for the position
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that section 7 is concerned with competition in the future as well as present concentra-
tions. A divestiture order was not rendered because the Commission thought that the
dynamics of the industry, particularly the ease of entry into it, would dissipate the re-
straints on competition effected by the acquisitions.
LIMITED PARTNERSHIP - ACTION BETWEEN PARTNERS - ACCOUNTING - Millard
v. Newmark & Co., 24 App. Div. 2d 333 (N.Y. 1966). - Plaintiffs are 32 limited
partners of Terrace Associates who sued their general partners both in their indi-
vidual capacity and derivatively. The complaint charged the general partners with
fraud, misrepresentation, and misconduct. The plaintiffs seek restitution of assets to
Terrace as well as damages for wrongs done to Terrace and to themselves as investors.
The court held that even though a limited partnership may be regarded in some in-
stances as a distinct entity for the purpose of pleading, a limited partner has no right
to sue in a derivative capacity on behalf of the partnership. If there was wrong done,
each partner suffered a separate injury and has his own cause of action.
TORTS - INJURIES TO PERSON - INTERFERENCE WITH EMPLOYMENT OR OCCUPA-
TION - TELECOMMUNICATIONS - CIVIL RIGHTS AND LIABILITIES - Morrison v.
National Broadcasting Co., 226 N.Y.S.2d 406 (App. Div. 1965). - Plaintiff, a
young university student, alleged that defendants, television producers and executives,
falsely induced him to take, part in a well-known television quiz show, "Twenty-one,"
which was in fact rigged and dishonest. Plaintiff alleged that is a result of his innocent
participation and the scandal about the show, his general reputation was harmed and
he -was deprived of two scholastic opportunities. To defendants' assertion that the
plaintiff failed to state a cause of action, the Appellate Division, reversing the lower
court, held that the case "explores the common law reach in providing a remedy for
foreseeable harms resulting from intentional conduct." The intentional use of wrong-
ful means and the deliberate exposure of the plaintiff to an unreasonable risk provides
a basis for remedy, even though defendants' conduct could not be neatly categorized as
deceit, negligence, defamation, or prima fade tort.
ARMED SERVICES - VALIDITY OF STATUTES - United States v. Smith; 249 F. Supp.
515 (S.D. Iowa 1965). - Defendant publicly burned his selective service registration
certificate to express his opposition to the war in Viet Nam and the selective service in
-general; he was charged with violating a statute which made it a criminal offense for
one to either willfully and knowingly mutilate his selective service registration certifi-
care, or to fail to have such certificate in his possession at all times. The court held
that the statute did not deprive defendant of his constitutional right to assemble peace-
ably; moreover, while the statute admittedly resulted in a partial abridgment of de-
fendant's right to freedom of speech, such result is justified because it promotes-the
operation of the selective service system.
CRIMINAL LAw - DISCHARGE FOR FAILURE TO PROSECUTE - DOUBLE JEOPARDY
- City of Columbus v. Nappi, 5 Ohio St. 2d 99, 214 N.E.2d 83 (1966). - Defendant
was charged with violation of a section of the Ohio Revised Code and a city ordinance.
The charge was dismissed because of the prosecution's delay in proceeding- after the
affidavits charging defendant were filed. Upon the subsequent charge of the same
alleged crime, defendant pleaded double jeopardy and lack of a speedy trial. The court
allowed the second prosecution holding that the discharge was purely procedural and
pertained only to a release from custody not from the specified offense. In the absence
of express statutory language barring a subsequent prosecution, the import of the Ohio
Revised Code is not to dismiss defendant from the charge which can then be brought
at a later date. The right to a speedy trial applies only to an existing charge; successive
prosecutions as such do not violate this right.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT - IMPRISONMENT
OF SEXUAL PSYCHOPATHS - People v. Schaletzke, 49 Cal. Rptr. 275 (D. Ct. App.
1966). - Defendant pleaded guilty to performing lewd and lascivious acts on the body
of a fourteen year old child. The superintendent of a state hospital to which defendant
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had been committed reported that defendant was a "mentally disordered sex offender,
but he is not amenable to treatment in a hospital setting." The defendant was sen-
tenced to a state prison. The appellate court rejected defendant's claim that this was
cruel and unusual punishment on the ground that the primary purpose of the act was
to protect the public, and rehabilitation of the psychopath was only a secondary purpose.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - UNLAwUUL ASSEMBLY - PUNISHMENT op SiT-INs DOES
NOT VIOLATE THE FIRST AMENDMENT - In re Bacon, 49 Cal. Rep. 322 (D. Cr. App.
1966. - The accused was a part of a protest demonstration at a college administration
building. Upon the closing of the building, the accused refused to leave and was ar-
rested. The court rejected defendant's claim that the California statutes requiring one
to leave a public building after closing and prohibiting unlawful assembly were uncon-
stitutional. In upholding the statutes, the court found that the interest of a democratic
society in ordered liberty outweighed the right of free speech and free assembly.
